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During the course of a lifetime you meet and are impressed by a vari-
ety of people. Some are good-hearted, others professionally able, while
still others, no matter what their position or status in life, are your
friends. Rarely does one meet and is blessed by knowing and befriend-
ing an individual whose heart and brain are totally dedicated toward
helping mankind. In 1978, when I met Joseph Crowley, I knew he was
a great labor lawyer, I knew he was a famous arbitrator, I knew he was
a learned professor, but over the years I also came to know that he was
one of the purest, most compassionate and dedicated human beings that
I would ever meet Joe Crowley never viewed humanity in a hierarchical
structure. If you were in trouble or in need, he was there. I never heard
him disparage anyone. I have never known anyone who could not seek
his solace or advice. His professional achievements are obvious; his
teaching ability extraordinary, but these are not the primary attributes
that I will always remember of Joe. It was his unique combination of
heart and mind that I found to be unparalleled. He was the soul of
Fordham Law School He was not just a mentor to me in a pedagogical
sense; he was my friend. I will never forget walking with him in Jerusa-
lem. I will never forget his constant advice as to the true meaning and
value of life. Materialism never impressed Joe, nor did status; it was not
who you were but what you were made of that was important to him.
His love for his family, his respect for anyone regardless of race, religion
or creed set him apart from the rest of us. I have been blessed with four
children and I wish that one day when they are older, I can look at them
and say Joe Crowley would have been proud if he saw them now.
Whether it was in the little Yemenite town of Ramatiym in Israel or
in Lincoln Center or in Sam's Gedney Way in White Plains, he was the
same human being who always emerged as a thoughtful, kind, energetic
and extremely loyal friend. After our trip to Israel he called me Avi; I
in turn called him Yossi, a nickname for Joseph in Hebrew. To say that
I loved him is an understatement. He was my mentor and guide, he
made me for better or for worse what I am today professionally, but
more importantly for what I am as a human being. In Hebrew we never
say goodbye. We always say Lehitraot, which means we shall meet
again. And so I conclude Lehitraot Yossi, one day we shall meet again.
I will never forget you and I dedicate the following Article to your
memory.
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 1967, City University
of New York (Queens); J.D. 1970, State University of New York (Buffalo); LL.M. 1971,
J.S.D. 1976, Columbia University. My thanks to Natalie A. Bocca for her research
assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
The public has a compelling interest in detecting those who would
traffic in deadly drugs for personal profit. Few problems affecting the
health and welfare of our population, particularly our young, cause
greater concern than the escalating use of controlled substances.
Much of the drug traffic is highly organized and conducted by sophisti-
cated criminal syndicates. The profits are enormous .... As a result,
the obstacles to detection of illegal conduct may be unmatched in any
other area of law enforcement.'
No one disputes the magnitude of the illegal drug problem in the
United States.' The cost of investigating and prosecuting highly sophisti-
cated, well financed drug lords constantly escalates. 3 The human cost is
vividly apparent at every level of our society.4 The war against illegal
importation of narcotics into the United States drains valuable law en-
forcement and judicial resources, yet yields minimal long-term results. A
major current battle concerns money-laundering.5 Government authori-
ties hope that if "drug money" cannot find its way back to narcotics
producers, then the importation of drugs may decline. While money-
laundering devices occasionally are original and diverse,6 narco-dollars
are frequently exported simply and directly by couriers carrying large
amounts of cash out of the country.7
Provisions of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act,
in particular 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5316 and 5317,8 and the fraudulent
1. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561-62 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
2. Recent estimates show that Americans spend $80 billion each year on illegal nar-
cotics. See Money Laundering Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985) (statement of Jay B.
Stephens, Associate Deputy United States Attorney General) [hereinafter cited as Money
Laundering Hearings].
3. See N.Y. Times, June 13, 1985, at B10, col. 1.
4. See N.Y. Times, June 27, 1985, at B2, col. 2 (allegations of money laundering by
New Jersey casino owner); N.Y. Times, June 13, 1985, at B10, col. 6 (Attorney General
Edwin Meese III requests $101 million to hire additional personnel to combat drug traf-
fickers); N.Y. Times, May 2, 1985, at All, col. 6 (Colombia seizes reported leader of
drug trafficking ring as suspect in killing of DEA agent in Mexico).
5. See Money Laundering Hearings, supra note 1, at 1-2. A centerpiece of the gov-
ernment's fight against drug trafficking is the statutory requirement that bank cash trans-
actions of more than $10,000 be reported. See Wall St. J., February 12, 1985, at 2, col. 4.
6. See Money Laundering Hearings, supra note I, at 2.
7. See United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1984),modified
on other grounds, 772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Grotke, 702 F.2d 49, 50-
51 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Gomez Londono, 553 F.2d 805, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1977).
8. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5322 (1982). Section 5313 states:
(a) When a domestic financial institution is involved in a transaction for the
payment, receipt, or transfer of United States coins or currency (or other mone-
tary instruments the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes), in an amount, de-
nomination, or amount and denomination, or under circumstances the
Secretary prescribes by regulation, the institution and any other participant in
the transaction the Secretary may prescribe shall file a report on the transaction
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at the time and in the way the Secretary prescribes. A participant acting for
another person shall make the report as the agent or bailee of the person and
identify the person for whom the transaction is being made.
(b) the Secretary may designate a domestic financial institution as an agent
of the United States Government to receive a report under this section. How-
ever, the Secretary may designate a domestic financial institution that is not
insured, chartered, examined, or registered as a domestic financial institution
only if the institution consents. The Secretary may suspend or revoke a
designation for a violation of this subchapter or a regulation under this sub-
chapter (except a violation of section 5315 of this title or a regulation prescribed
under section 5315), section 411 of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C.
1730d), or section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1829b).
(c)(1) A person (except a domestic financial institution designated under
subsection (b) of this section) required to file a report under this section shall file
the report-
(A) with the institution involved in the transaction if the institution
was designated;
(B) in the way the Secretary prescribes when the institution was not
designated; or
(C) with the Secretary.
(2) The Secretary shall prescribe-
(A) the filing procedure for a domestic financial institution desig-
nated under subsection (b) of this section; and
(B) the way the institution shall submit reports filed with it.
L § 5313. The regulations promulgated under this section require financial institutions
to file a Currency Transaction Report with the Treasury Department within 15 days after
a customer deposits, withdraws or transfers currency in excess of S10,000. See 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.25(a) (1985). An individual may be under a duty to file a report if he engages as a
business in dealing or exchanging currency. See id § 103.11 (b)(3). The Second Circuit
relied on that regulation in finding particular individuals to constitute a financial institu-
tion for purposes of the Act. See United States v. Goldberg, 756 F.2d 949, 953-54 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2706 (1985).
Section 5316 states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person or an agent
or bailee of the person shall file a report under subsection (b) of this section
when the person, agent, or ballee knowingly-
(1) transports or has transported monetary instruments of more than
$10,000 at one time-
(A) from a place in the United States to or through a place outside
the United States; or
(B) to a place in the United States from or through a place outside
the United States; or
(2) receives monetary instruments of more than $5,000 at one time trans-
ported into the United States from or through a place outside the United States.
(b) A report under this section shall be filed at the time and place the Secre-
tary of the Treasury prescribes. The report shall contain the following informa-
tion to the extent the Secretary prescribes:
(1) the legal capacity in which the person filing the report is acting.
(2) the origin, destination, and route of the monetary instruments.
(3) when the monetary instruments are not legally and beneficially
owned by the person transporting the instruments, or if the person trans-
porting the instruments personally is not going to use them, the identity of
the person that gave the instruments to the person transporting them, the
identity of the person who is to receive them, or both.
(4) the amount and kind of monetary instruments transported.
(5) additional information.
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statements statute,9 when applied together in money-laundering prosecu-
tions provide law enforcement officers with a powerful investigative
tool.' ° However, the broad discretionary power granted to government
authorities may severely impinge on individual freedoms, especially those
guaranteed by the fourth and fifth amendments." This Article will ana-
lyze and suggest some basic measures necessary to balance the federal
government's interest in fighting illegal narcotics syndicates with the pre-
cious fourth and fifth amendment rights of the general public.
(c) This section or a regulation under this section does not apply to a com-
mon carrier of passengers when a passenger possesses a monetary instrument,
or to a common carrier of goods if the shipper does not declare the instrument.
31 U.S.C.A. § 5316 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985).
Section 5317 states:
(a) The Secretary of the Treasury may apply to a court of competent juris-
diction for a search warrant when the Secretary reasonably believes a monetary
instrument is being transported and a report on the instrument under section
5316 of this title has not been filed or contains a material omission or misstate-
ment. The Secretary shall include a statement of information in support of the
warrant. On a showing of probable cause, the court may issue a search warrant
for a designated person or a designated or described place or physical object.
This subsection does not affect the authority of the Secretary under another law.
(b) A customs officer may stop and search, without a search warrant, a
vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other conveyance, envelope, or other container, or
person entering or departing from the United States with respect to which or
whom the officer has reasonable cause to believe there is a monetary instrument
being transported in violation of section 5316 of this title.
Id. § 5317.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). The statute provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency
of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by
any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ment or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
10. See Collora & Tillotson, Defense Perspective of Prosecuting Criminal Cases Under
Secrecy Act, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 17, 1986, at 30, col. 1. The Supreme Court removed one
possible obstacle to the joint application of the statutes in United States v. Woodward,
105 S. Ct. 611 (1985) (per curiam). The Court held that an individual could be convicted
under the fraudulent statements statute and the currency reporting statute for the same
conduct. See id. at 613.
11. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no war-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
The fifth amendment provides in part: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... U.S. Const. amend. V.
474 [Vol. 54
MONEY-LA UNDERING AND NARCOTICS
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act
Enacted in 1970, the Bank Secrecy Act, 2 which includes the Currency
and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, was intended to enlarge the
amount of financial information available to government law enforce-
ment agencies in criminal, tax and regulatory prosecutions. 3 Section
5313" 4 requires financial institutions to report any domestic currency
transaction in excess of $10,000 to the Internal Revenue Service. 5 This
reporting requirement is known as the Currency Transaction Report
(CTR).16
Section 5313 received increased attention last year when, on February
7, 1985, federal investigators charged the First National Bank of Boston,
a unit of Bank of Boston, Inc., with failure to report illicit cash transac-
tions totalling $1.22 billion.' 7 The bank pleaded guilty and was fined
$500,000, the largest fine ever imposed for violating the statute.'8 Most
of the deposits involved had been made in bills of $50 or less, and the
withdrawals were made in bills of $100 or more. 9 Much of the money
was shipped to foreign banks in bricks of $100 bills.2"
Section 5316,21 the exporting and importing monetary instruments re-
porting statute, provides that any person transporting, mailing, shipping
or causing the transportation, mailing or shipping of currency or mone-
tary instruments worth more than $10,000 must file a report with the
United States Customs Service. This report is known as the Report of
Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments (CMIR).2 A con-
viction for violation of section 5316 requires several general factors. The
government must prove that the person wilfully failed to file a written
12. See Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959 (1976) and 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1062, 1081-1083, 1101-1105,
1121-1122 (1976) (recodified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5314, 5316-5322
(1982)).
13. "It is the purpose of this subchapter [31 U.S.C. § 5311] (e.xcept section 5315) to
require certain reports or records where they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal,
tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings." 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1982).
14. 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1982). The Treasury Department issued regulations pursuant
to the statute. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1985).
15. 31 C.F.R. § 103.25(a) (1985).
16. Id. § 103.25(b).
17. See Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1985, at 3, col. 4. The statute has been aggressively en-
forced in Boston. See Wong, U.S. Attorney Weld Takes Tough Stance on Banks' Cash-
Reporting Violations, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1986, at 30, col. 6.
18. Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1985, at 3, col. 4.
19. Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1985, at 2, col. 4.
20. Id. at 27, col. 6.
21. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5316 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985). The Treasury Department issued
regulations pursuant to the statute. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 (1985).
22. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.25(a), (b) (1985). Anyone carrying more than the statutory
figure must file, but the entire amount must not be reported, not only the excess over the
requisite amount. Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362, 1373-74 (9th Cir. 1978).
1986]
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report2 3 and that the currency was being transported either into or out of
the United States. To satisfy the "out of the United States" element of
the crime, a traveler must have manifested a firm commitment to leave
the United States.2 4
In order to prove knowing and wilful failure to report, defendants
must have notice of the filing requirement.2  However, the government
may not have a duty to explain explicitly and directly to the public that
the transportation of more than the statutory amount without the requi-
site report constitutes a crime.26 For example, the prosecution's burden
of proving that the defendant knew of the reporting requirement may be
met when it shows that the defendant signed a form that warned of the
penalties for false reporting and that indicated an additional form would
have to be completed if he were carrying more than the requisite amount
either into or out of the country. 7 Although there had been some uncer-
tainty regarding whether an individual's awareness that more than a cer-
tain amount of money would be transported in or out of the country
would satisfy the statute's knowledge and intent requirements, it is now
fairly established that there must be knowledge and specific intent to
avoid the statute's reporting requirement.28
23. See United States v. Gomez-Londono, 422 F. Supp. 519, 525 (E.D.N.Y.) (a viola-
tion requires a written report; an oral statement to a government official is subject to 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (1982), not 31 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976) (recodified at 31 U.S.C. § 5316
(1982))), rev'd on other grounds, 553 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1976). But see United States v.
Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 507 (9th Cir. 1984) (31 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976) (recodified at 31
U.S.C. § 5316 (1982)) does not require a written statement), modified on other grounds,
772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985).
24. United States v. Gomez Londono, 553 F.2d 805, 810 (2d Cir. 1977) (appellee had
his ticket, had checked his luggage and was "headed toward the departure area"); United
States v. Cutaia, 511 F. Supp. 619, 625 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (passengers had purchased their
tickets, checked their luggage and were scheduled to leave in 30 minutes; court held that
the passenger had manifested a definite commitment to leave the U.S.).
25. United States v. San Juan, 545 F.2d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 1976).
26. See United States v. Rodriguez, 592 F.2d 553, 557 (9th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Gomez Londono, 553 F.2d 805, 811 (2d Cir. 1977). But see United States v.
Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1211-12 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Granda, 565
F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1978).
27. United States v. Rodriguez, 592 F.2d 553, 557 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit
distinguished Granda and Schnaiderman on the grounds that the forms given to the pas-
sengers in those cases "asked only whether the traveler was carrying into the United
States over $5,000 in currency. It did not refer to the reporting requirement or [the
additional form]." Id. at 557. The Ninth Circuit underscored the importance of this
distinction in United States v. Chen, 605 F.2d 433, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1979). The Rodri-
guez court remarked in dictum that while it might be "good policy," it is not a legal
requirement to inform travelers that importing over the statutory amount in monetary
instruments is legal. See Rodriguez, 592 F.2d at 557 (dictum).
28. See United States v. Chen, 605 F.2d 433, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Rodriguez, 592 F.2d 553, 557 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d
208, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 925-26 (5th Cir.
1978). The uncertainty stemmed from a district court case that held in a forfeiture case
under 31 U.S.C. § 5317 (1982), the word "knowingly" applied "to the transportation of
money and not to specific knowledge about the reporting requirements." See United
States v. $4,255,625.39, 528 F. Supp. 969, 972 (S.D. Fla. 1981). The Eleventh Circuit
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In section 5317,29 Congress has provided a framework for searches of
individuals suspected of violating section 5316. Section 5317(a) allows
an application based on probable cause to be made for a warrant to
search a person on his property. 30 This provision does not limit the gov-
ernment's authority to conduct searches under existing law.3' Section
5317(b), however, is an exception to the statute's warrant requirement
and seemingly renders section 5317(a) meaningless.32 Section 5317(b)
authorizes customs officials to stop and search individuals or their prop-
erty, whether entering or leaving the United States, if the official has
"reasonable cause to believe there is a monetary instrument being trans-
ported in violation of section 5316.' ' 33 As will be discussed below,' this
provision is most disturbing because it is ill-conceived and ignores signifi-
cant fourth amendment jurisprudence to the extent the section applies to
persons exiting from the United States.
B. 18 U.S.C. § 1001
Title 18, United States Code section 1001, 3 1 punishes fraudulent state-
ments made to a federal agency.36 The statute is designed to deter fraud
on government agencies 37 and to help uncover deceptive practices aimed
at frustrating or impeding legitimate agency functions.3"
Federal courts have applied the statute inconsistently. 39 Courts that
broadly interpreted the statute reasoned it was violated whenever a per-
son made a materially false statement that had the capacity to prevent, or
rejected this view because the statute's purpose, both in its criminal and forfeiture provi-
sions, was to obtain reports of foreign transactions "where such reports would be helpful
in investigations of criminal, tax and regulatory violations." United States v. One (1) Lot
of $24,900.00 in U.S. Currency, 770 F.2d 1530, 1534 (11 th Cir. 1985). The court deter-
mined that even if a § 5316 criminal suit could not be brought absent knowledge of the
reporting requirement, a forfeiture suit brought against someone who lacked such knowl-
edge would still "fly in the face of Congress' goal of obtaining currency reports." Id. at
1535.
29. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(a) (1982).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5317(b) (West Supp. 1985).
33. Id.
34. See infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
36. United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77, 82 (1969).
37. See United States v. Fern, 696 F.2d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894, 899 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983).
38. United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1101 (1Ith Cir. 1983).
39. Compare United States v. Yermian, 708 F.2d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 1983) (defendant
must know when making false statement that subject matter was within the federal
agency's jurisdiction), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2936 (1984) and United States v. Hajecate, 683
F.2d 894, 896-97 (5th Cir. 1982) (legal acts become illegal when they are elements of a
scheme to obstruct a government agency), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983); with United
States v. Fern, 696 F.2d 1269, 1273 (11 th Cir. 1983) (defendant's unsolicited false state-
ment, if material, falls within the statute's coverage) and United States v. Richmond, 700
F.2d 1183, 1187 (8th Cir. 1983) (false statement need not have been made directly to
federal agency).
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merely influence, a governmental function 4 --scienter was not re-
quired.41 Moreover, the statutory phrase "in any matter within the juris-
diction of any department or agency of the United States" 42 was loosely
defined as the ability of any agency to exercise its authority. 43 Those
courts narrowly construing the statute concluded that, to be punishable,
the allegedly fraudulent statements had to be affirmative.44 In addition,
jurisdiction was given a restrictive reading." Finally, actual knowledge
by the alleged violators of government involvement was deemed an essen-
tial element of the crime.46
The Supreme Court resolved some of these conflicts in 1984 in United
States v. Rodgers " and United States v. Yermian. In Rodgers, the
Court held that the term "jurisdiction" in the statute must be interpreted
broadly.4 9 In reversing the Eighth Circuit's decision that the statute's
scope did not reach criminal investigations by the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation and the Secret Service,5" the Court relied on the ordinary
meaning of the statutory language "in any matter within the jurisdiction
of any department or agency of the United States."'" The Court rejected
the court of appeals' definition of jurisdiction because that approach
would exclude virtually all departmental and agency activities from the
statute's coverage. 2 Justice Rehnquist observed that "[tihe most natu-
ral, nontechnical reading of the statutory language is that it covers all
40. See United States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1188 (8th Cir. 1983). Under
§ 1001, materiality involves only the abstract capability of influencing an agency's gov-
ernmental function. See United States v. Fern, 696 F.2d 1269, 1274 (1 1th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Carrier, 654 F.2d 559, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1981).
41. See United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Stanford, 589 F.2d 285, 297 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
43. See Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 70-71 (1969); United States v. Rich-
mond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (8th Cir. 1983). The Bryson Court gave § 1001 a broad
interpretation, noting that the term jurisdiction in the statute should not be given a nar-
row or technical meaning. See Bryson, 396 U.S. at 71.
44. See United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 1981); Paternostro v.
United States, 311 F.2d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 1962).
45. See United States v. Rodgers, 706 F.2d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 466 U.S.
475 (1984); Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 369 (8th Cir. 1967).
46. See United States v. Yermian, 708 F.2d 365, 371 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
2936 (1984).
47. 466 U.S. 475 (1984).
48. 104 S. Ct. 2936 (1984).
49. See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984).
50. See United States v. Rodgers, 706 F.2d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 466 U.S,
475 (1984). Although the court acknowledged that two other courts of appeals had
reached a different result on this question, id. (citing United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d
943, 946 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane) and United States v. Adler, 380 F.2d 917, 921-22 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006 (1967)), the court preferred the rule it had enunciated in
Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967); see Rodgers, 706 F.2d at 856.
51. Rodgers, 466 U.S. at 479 (emphasis in original).
52. The Eighth Circuit defined jurisdiction for the purposes of the statute as "the
power to make final or binding determinations." See id. at 477 (quoting Friedman v.
United States, 374 F.2d 363, 367 (8th Cir. 1967)).
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matters confided to the authority of an agency or department.""3
In Yermian, the Court held that a conviction under the statute does
not require proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of federal
agency jurisdiction.' The Court reasoned that the statute's terms
"knowingly and willfully" modified the words "false, fictitious or fraudu-
lent statements" and not the requirement that the matter be within the
jurisdiction of a federal department or agency." Thus, Rodgers and Yer-
mian are significant additions to law enforcement's arsenal against drug
trafficking.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS
The fourth amendment protects an individual's reasonable expectation
of privacy. 6 In the absence of a warrant based on probable cause," any
governmental intrusion of constitutionally protected areas is presump-
tively unreasonable. 8 Legitimate needs of law enforcement, however,
have created exceptions to the warrant and probable cause require-
ments. 9 The most relevant in the use of the Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act and the fraudulent statements statute are the
"stop and frisk,"' the border search,61 and reverse border search excep-
tions,62 and the statutory exception contained in section 5317(b).63
A. The Stop and Frisk Exception
The stop and frisk exception to the probable cause and warrant re-
quirements of the fourth amendment originated in Terry v. Ohio.' In
53. See id at 479.
54. United States v. Yermian, 104 S. Ct. 2936, 2943 (1984).
55. See id at 2940. Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist dissented, noting that an earlier
version of the statute placed the words "knowingly and willfully" before the jurisdictional
requirement. See Yermian, 104 S. Ct. at 2945 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Act of
June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996). Justice Rehnquist observed that the 1948 revision
of the statute was not designated to make any substantive changes. See id. (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
56. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
57. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Court adopted a common sense, or
"totality-of-the-circumstances" approach to determinations of probable cause. See id. at
238.
58. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
59. Exceptions are based on a "balancing of the competing governmental and individ-
ual interests." See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); see, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808-09 (1982) (the motor vehicle
exception to the warrant requirement); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17, 31, (1968) (the stop
and frisk exception); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (exigent circumstances
exception).
60. See infra notes 64-98 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 138-49 and accompanying text.
64. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). One commentator suggested that the "low profile" of the stop
and frisk practice explains why it had been able to avoid earlier judicial scrutiny. See
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Terry, an experienced police officer who suspected criminal activity
stopped and frisked the defendant.65 The Court held that in order to
achieve effective crime prevention, law enforcement agents should be al-
lowed to "stop and frisk" suspects absent probable cause to arrest that
suspect.66 Nevertheless, such an investigative device had to be governed
by the dictates of the fourth amendment. 67  Basing its decision on the
independence of the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment,68
the Court held that a police officer could stop and search a suspect for
weapons if the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and
reasonably believed he was dealing with an armed and dangerous
individual.69
In Terry, the Court distinguished police-citizen interactions. An "en-
counter," which is not governed by the fourth amendment, involves the
voluntary cooperation of the individual. 70 The stop or seizure of a per-
son, however, involves detention.71 This kind of police officer-public
contact is governed by the fourth amendment and must be based on a
reasonable inference that the suspect is armed.72
Until United States v. Mendenhall,7" the demarcation between stops
and encounters was fairly clear. Encounters involved polite questioning
by a police officer 74 and stops entailed a showing of authority by the law
enforcement agent.75 Mendenhall, however, blurred the demarcation.
In Mendenhall, the defendant, who satisfied the drug courier profile,76
was approached by Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents as
she disembarked from a plane. The agents requested her plane ticket and
Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (4 Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. Crim.
L.C. & P.S. 433, 463 (1967). For a good discussion of the stop and frisk procedure pre-
Terry, see 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment
§ 9.1(a) (1978).
65. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-7.
66. See id at 30-31.
67. See id. at 20.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 27. The Court did not want to prevent an officer from finding out
whether the suspicious individual was armed with a potentially lethal weapon, see id. at
23, regardless of any probable cause for arrest. Justice Harlan asserted that this notion of
an officer's right to protect himself was the only acceptable rationale for the Court's deci-
sion. See id. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring). The importance of this safety rationale is
seen in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), where an officer's search of a suspect was
unlawful because the officer was seeking narcotics, and not acting out of concern for his
own safety. See id. at 63-66. The Court in Terry did not address the propriety of investi-
gative seizures for detention and/or interrogation on less than probable cause. See Terry,
392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
70. See Terry, 352 U.S. at 19 n.16.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 16-17.
73. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
74. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 13.
75. See id. at 19 n.16.
76. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547 & n. 1.
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driver's license, which bore different names." The defendant could not
explain the discrepancy.78 Subsequently, the agents asked her to follow
them to their office and she agreed.7 9 Once inside the DEA office, the
defendant allegedly consented to a strip search.8"
The Mendenhall holding is unclear. Two justices found that the re-
spondent had not been seized." Three justices assumed that the respon-
dent had been seized, but because reasonable suspicion existed, the
seizure was lawful.8 2 All five justices in the plurality agreed that the
search was consensual.83 The Court thereby avoided characterizing
Mendenhall's confrontation with the authorities as either a stop or an
encounter. This enabled the Court to circumvent the question of
whether Terry should be expanded to include a search for evidence other
than weapons.
This question may have been resolved in Florida v. Royer." Like Men-
denhall, Royer was an airport "stop for questioning" case. The defend-
ant satisfied the drug courier profile and drug enforcement agents
77. Id at 548.
78. Id
79. Id
80. Id at 548-49.
81. The Court was sharply divided in Mendenhall. Justice Stewart announced the
judgment of the Court and wrote an opinion that Justice Rehnquist joined. See id. at 546.
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun and Justice Powell joined in all of the Stewart
opinion except the section addressing the seizure issue. See id at 560. Justice White's
dissent was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. See id. at 566.
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist concluded that a fourth amendment seizure occurs
when "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave." See id. at 554 (Stewart, J.) (footnote
omitted). Thus, a seizure could occur even when an individual did not try to leave if an
officer displayed a weapon, made a threatening presence with other officers, physically
touched the suspect or indicated through words or tone of voice that "compliance with
the officer's request might be compelled." Id. (citations omitted). The two Justices con-
cluded that Mendenhall had not been seized. See id. at 555 (Stewart, J.).
Because the lower courts did not consider that issue, Justice Powell's concurring opin-
ion did not discuss whether a seizure occurred. Id at 560 (Powell, J., concurring). This
omission by the district court and the court of appeals was due to the government's ear-
lier posture that a seizure took place but was justified by reasonable suspicion. See id. at
567-68 (White, J., dissenting). In a footnote, however, Justice Powell stated that the
question of whether Mendenhall could have reasonably believed she was free to walk
away from the agents was "extremely close." See id at 560 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
The dissenters objected to Justice Stewart's discussion of the seizure issue for three
reasons. See id at 570-71 (White, J., dissenting). First, Justice White remarked that the
Court usually does not reverse judgments on grounds not raised below. See id. at 570-71
& n.6 (White, J., dissenting). Second, the seizure issue raises factual questions that
should be determined by the trial court. Id. at 570-71 (White, J., dissenting). The third
objection is an outgrowth of the first two-the factual record before the Court might be
inadequate because the seizure question had not been litigated previously. See id. at 570
(White, J., dissenting). Thus, it is unclear whether facts similar to those in Mendenhall
would constitute a seizure for fourth amendment purposes.
82. The three Justices based this finding on all of the circumstances and not just on
the "drug courier profile." See id at 565 & n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
83. See id. at 558-59.
84. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
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stopped him shortly after he had paid cash for a one-way plane ticket
from Miami to New York City. 5 The agents identified themselves, re-
quested the defendant's ticket and driver's license, and then checked the
name tags on his luggage.8 6 The officers observed discrepancies that the
defendant could not adequately explain 7 and Royer became visibly ner-
vous. 8 After the agents expressed their suspicion about his conduct,
they asked him to follow them to a large storage room.8 9 Without ver-
bally expressing his consent, Royer followed.9" Meanwhile, the govern-
ment officers had retrieved the defendant's luggage without his
approval.91 They asked Royer for permission to open his luggage. Royer
handed the officers the keys to one suitcase, but could not remember the
combination to the other suitcase.92 The agents forced open the suitcase,
discovered drugs, and arrested the defendant. 93
In reversing the defendant's conviction, Justice White's plurality opin-
ion noted that his detention exceeded the bounds of an investigative
stop.94 Moreover, since the officers lacked probable cause, the detention
and subsequent search were unlawful.95 Although the plurality opinion
quoted Terry in its analysis of the scope of a warrantless search,96 it en-
dorsed a "least intrusive means" test to evaluate the reasonableness of an
investigative stop. Justice White wrote that "the investigative methods
employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to ver-
85. Royer, 460 U.S. at 493-94 & n.1 (plurality opinion of White, J.).
86. Id. at 494 (plurality opinion of White, J.).
87. Id. (plurality opinion of White, J.).
88. Id. (plurality opinion of White, J.).
89. Id. (plurality opinion of White, J.).
90. Id. (plurality opinion of White, J.).
91. Id. (plurality opinion of White, J.).
92. Id. (plurality opinion of White, J.).
93. Id. at 494-95 (plurality opinion of White, J.).
94. See id. at 501 (plurality opinion of White, J.). Justice White, whose opinion was
joined by Justices Marshall, Powell and Stevens, see id. at 491 (plurality opinion of
White, J.), focused on several aspects of the confrontation in determining that Royer had
been subjected to an impermissible "intrusion on his personal liberty" by the time he
produced the key to his luggage, see id. at 502-03 (plurality opinion of White, J.). Royer
went to a small room where the police accused him of carrying narcotics. Id. (plurality
opinion of White, J.) The officers had retrieved Royer's checked luggage without his con-
sent and held his plane ticket and identification. Id. at 503. (plurality opinion of White,
J.) These facts served to distinguish Royer from Mendenhall. Id. at 503 n.9. (plurality
opinion of White, J.) Justice Rehnquist, however, did not find the officers' conduct unrca-
sonable, see id. at 520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and characterized the plurality's opin-
ion as "meandering," see id. at 519 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also id. at 520
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The opinion.., betrays a mind-set more useful to those who
officiate at shuffleboard games, primarily concerned with which particular square the disc
has landed on, than to those who are seeking to administer a system of justice whose twin
purposes are the conviction of the guilty and the vindication of the innocent.").
95. See id. at 507-08 (plurality opinion of White, J.).
96. "'The scope of a search must be "strictly tied to and justified by" the circum-
stances which rendered its initiation permissible.'" Id. at 500 (plurality opinion of
White, J.) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring))).
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ify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time."9 Thus,
Royer's "least intrusive means" test arguably expands Terry stops by
permitting a limited search for evidence other than weapons.98
B. Border and Reverse Border Search Exceptions
The border search exception is actually an exception to the fourth
amendment itself and not to the amendment's probable cause or warrant
requirements.99 Created by the First Congress when it gave the govern-
ment the right to stop and search anyone or anything entering the coun-
try,"°° the exception is based on the United States' right as a sovereign to
protect itself.101 One conducting the search, however, must "proceed in
a reasonable manner."' 12 The reasonableness of the search depends on
97. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 (plurality opinion of White, J.). Justice White also stated:
The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that
law enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security
of the suspect. The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent
with the particular facts and circumstances of each case. This much, however,
is clear: an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.
Id (plurality opinion of White, J.) Justice Brennan questioned the relevance of a least
intrusive means test in the context of a Terry-stop analysis. See id. at 511 n.0 (Brennan,
J., concurring in result). Justice Rehnquist was also unconvinced by the plurality's ap-
proach. Iad at 528 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
98. Justice White acknowledged that there could be no clear test for determining
when the limits of an investigative stop have been exceeded. Id. at 506 (plurality opinion
of White, J.). He did, however, observe that the officers could have "investigate[d] the
contents of Royer's bags in a more expeditious way." Id. at 505 (plurality opinion of
White, J.). It was suggested that the use of trained dogs to detect the presence of drugs in
Royer's luggage would have been acceptable. See id. at 505-06 (plurality opinion of
White, L). This might be seen as an expansion beyond the weapons search upheld in
Terry. In addition, the plurality hinted that "temporary detention for questioning on less
than probable cause" would be permitted "where the public interest involved is the sup-
pression of illegal transactions in drugs. ... See id. at 498-99 (plurality opinion of
White, J.); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975) (tempo-
rary detention for limited questioning was constitutional where the government's interest
was in upholding the immigration laws). Further support for a broad reading of Terry
can be found in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 & n.9 (1983), where the Court
noted that an investigative seizure of personal property could be justified under Terry.
99. This broad view of the exception is historically justified. Two months before
proposing the Bill of Rights, the First Congress enacted this country's first customs stat-
ute. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977); see Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1
Stat. 29 (1789). Based on the language contained in § 24, the Court determined that
border searches were not considered unreasonable by the First Congress and "not em-
braced within the prohibition of the amendment." See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 617 (emphasis
in original) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886)).
100. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 23, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. §§ 482, 1581(a), 1582 (1982). One commentator has challenged the historical ba-
sis for the border search exception. See Note, Beyond the Border of Reasonableness." Ex-
ports, Imports and the Border Search Exception, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 733, 751-52 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Beyond the Border].
101. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) ("national self protection rea-
sonably requir[es] one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and
his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in").
102. United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1984), modified on other
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the type of search involved and on the government's conduct.10 3 As the
degree of intrusion increases so does the quantum of proof needed to
justify the search."°
Customs searches involve different degrees of intrusiveness, ranging
from routine searches of luggage and patdown searches to strip searches
and body cavity searches. 0 5 In considering the reasonableness of a
search on any of these levels, various circuit courts have ruled that the
more intrusive the search, the more suspicion that must be demonstrated
for its justification."16
A routine border search does not require any suspicion 0 7 and may
include inspecting luggage and emptying pockets. '08 Here, the balance of
interests between law enforcement and individual rights tips decidedly in
favor of the government, whose "interest in controlling 'who and what
may enter the country' outweighs the privacy interests of those who
choose to travel to the United States."'0 9  Patdown searches generally
are considered more intrusive than routine searches and require what is
often described as mere or minimal suspicion.' ° Strip searches require
grounds, 772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985); see United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d
876, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1970) (strip search of person entering the United States unreasona-
ble absent "real suspicion").
103. See United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1984), modified on
other grounds, 772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d
991, 994 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977); United States v. Guadalupe-Garza,
421 F.2d 876, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1970).
104. See supra note 103, infra note 114 and accompanying text.
105. See United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 504-05 (9th Cir. 1984), modified
on other grounds, 772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985).
106. See id.; United States v. Sandier, 644 F.2d 1163, 1166 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane)
(quoting United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325, 1328 (5th Cir. 1978)); United States
v. Dorsey, 641 F.2d 1213, 1216 (7th Cir. 1981). See infra note 114 and accompanying
text.
107. United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1984), modified on other
grounds, 772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Sandier, 644 F.2d 1163, 1169 (5th
Cir. 1981) (en bane); United States v. Nieves, 609 F.2d 642, 646 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1085 (1980); United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973, 975 (2d Cir. 1978).
108. See United States v. Grayson, 597 F.2d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir.) (quoting United
States v. Palmer, 575 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978)), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 875 (1979).
109. United States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1358 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (quoting United
States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977)).
110. See United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1984), modified on
other grounds, 772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Sandier, 644 F.2d 1163,
1166 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); United States v. Grayson, 597 F.2d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 875 (1979); United States v. Carter, 563 F.2d 1360, 1361 (9th Cir.
1977).
Sitting en banc in Sandier, the Fifth Circuit lumped together a patdown search and
removal of outer garments, hat or shoe, as all part of a "routine examination" of a per-
son's effects. See Sandler, 644 F.2d at 1169. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that all of these
would require "mere" or "unsupported" suspicion. Id. at 1167. This approach implies
that an examination of a person-a patdown-and his effects are equally intrusive. The
dissent properly noted that the holding, which "confuses the search of things with the
search of the person," serves to diminish "the rights of human beings ... to those of
luggage." Id. at 1170 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). Even a special concurrence disagreed
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reasonable"' or real suspicion.1"2 Finally, body cavity searches, which
involve the highest degree of intrusion, require a "clear indication" of
smuggling.' 3 A recent Supreme Court decision, however, indicates that
reasonable suspicion might be the sufficient standard of proof in any
nonroutine border search.' 4
Traditionally, the border search exception applied only to individuals
entering the United States."' In recent years, however, a "reverse bor-
der search" exception has been judicially created and upheld as a variant
with extending the standard of "no justification necessary" to include a patdown. See id.
at 1169-70 (Anderson, J., concurring); see also United States v. Dorsey, 641 F.2d 1213,
1218 (7th Cir. 1981) (while declining to label the amount of suspicion required to justify a
patdown search, court noted that "the intrusions on privacy and indignities involved in a
patdown search exceed those of a search of the contents of a purse or wallet or of a
request to empty pockets").
111. United States v. Sandier, 644 F.2d 1163, 1166 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The
Second Circuit has required "suspicion of illegal concealment." See United States v. As-
bury, 586 F.2d 973, 975-76 (2d Cir. 1979).
112. The "real suspicion" test was more explicitly stated by the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1970):
'Real suspicion' justifying the initiation of a strip search is subjective suspi-
cion supported by objective, articulable facts that would reasonably lead an ex-
perienced, prudent customs official to suspect that a particular person seeking to
cross our border is concealing something on his body for the purpose of trans-
porting it into the United States contrary to law.
The objective, articulable facts must bear some reasonable relationship to sus-
picion that something is concealed on the body of the person to be searched;
otherwise, the scope of the search is not related to the justification for its initia-
tion, as it must be to meet the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
Simple good faith on the part of a customs official in entertaining subjective
suspicion unsupported by objective facts does not convert "mere suspicion" into
real suspicion.
Id. at 879 (citations omitted). This definition appears to draw on the wording of another
fourth amendment "exception" case-Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)-which requires
"specific and articulable facts" to justify a warrantless "stop and frisk." See id. at 21.
The Court rejected a standard based on the mere good faith of the police, and instead
required an objective standard. See id, at 21-22.
113. United States v. Castle, 409 F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 975 (1969); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967). The facts need not be the "equivalent of 'probable cause'
necessary for an arrest and search at a place other than a border." Rivas, 368 F.2d at
710. See generally 3 W. LaFave, supra note 64, § 10.5(c), at 286-95 (discussing applica-
tion of the clear indication test in various factual settings).
114. In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985), the Court
held that "the detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the scope of a routine customs
search and inspection, is justified at its inception if customs agents, considering all the
facts surrounding the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler is smug-
gling contraband in her alimentary canal." See il at 3311. Although the Court stressed
that it was not deciding what level of suspicion would be needed for any other type of
nonroutine border search, see id. at 3311 n.4, the Court appeared reluctant to create any
"third verbal standard in addition to 'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable cause.'" See
id. at 3311.
115. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
1986]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
border search."' The basis for such decisions, however, is suspect. This
new exception originated in California Bankers Association v. Shultz,' 17
where the issue before the Supreme Court was the constitutionality of the
Bank Secrecy Act.118 In California Bankers the Court stressed the gov-
ernment's strong interest in commercial transactions "across national
boundaries."11 It observed that "if those entering and leaving the coun-
try may be examined as to their belongings and effects, all without violat-
ing the Fourth Amendment, we see no reason to invalidate the
[regulation at issue] here."' 20 Although the Court in California Bankers
cited no case or statute in support of that proposition and engaged in no
analysis of the policies behind the border search exception, 2 , this dictum
has been quoted in support of the reverse border exception and is some-
times quoted as a direct statement, without the hypothetical "if.'
' 22
It was not until 1976 that a circuit court actually wrestled with the
validity of the reverse border search exception. United States v. Stan-
ley 123 involved the search of a boat suspected of carrying marijuana out
of the United States. 24 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and
upheld the search by drawing an analogy to the traditional border search
exception. 2 5 The court concluded that the governmental interests in ex-
port and import searches were similar. The court noted that both incom-
ing and outgoing border-crossing searches have several features in
common: the government's interest in restricting illicit international
drug trade; 12 6 the likelihood that drugs will be smuggled at the border; 127
the difficulty in detecting drug smuggling;1 28 individuals crossing the bor-
der are on notice that their privacy may be invaded, 129 and people
searched at the border belong to a morally neutral class.130
The first three common features address the government's interest in
116. See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
117. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
118. Id. at 25; see Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959 (1976) and 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1062, 1081-1083, 1101-1105,
1121-1122 (1976)) (recodified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5314, 5316-5322 (1982)).
119. See California Bankers, 416 U.S. at 62.
120. See id. at 63 (emphasis added).
121. See id.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Udofot, 711 F.2d 831, 840 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 896 (1983); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 834 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1111 (1981); see also United States v. Swarovski, 592 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir.
1979) (citing, but not quoting, California Bankers). Ironically, the first court to extend
the border search exception to those exiting the country did so without mentioning Cali-
fornia Bankers. See United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661, 665-67 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978).
123. 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978).
124. See id. at 663-64.
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controlling illicit drug trafficking.' The fourth feature, notice, is
equally valid as to those entering or leaving the country. 3 2 The fifth
feature, that a person will be searched only as a member of a morally
neutral class, is questionable. Although one could argue that individuals
entering the country belong to a morally neutral class, those actually
searched on departure are frequently those who satisfy a predetermined
"drug courier proffle."'
' 33
Although widely applied, the reverse border search exception has been
severely criticized. 134 Yet, despite the differences between the two excep-
tions,' the standard of proof required under the reverse border search
exception parallels the standard used in traditional border searches.' 3 6
Therefore, since a routine border search does not require a quantum of
proof,13 7 the border search and reverse border search exception would
permit a customs service agent to conduct, at will, a routine search of
any departing passenger.
C. 31 U.S.C, § 5317
Possibly aware of the broad discretion customs agents possess under
131. Congress had, in fact, made controlled substances illegal. See 21 U.S.C. § 955
(1982). It is
unlawful for any person to bring or possess on board any vessel.., arriving in
or departing from the United States or the customs territory of the United
States, a controlled substance... unless such substance or drug is a part of the
cargo entered in the manifest or part of the official supplies of the vessel, aircraft
or vehicle.
Id
132. See United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973, 975 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Stanley, 545 F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 1976), cerL denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978).
133. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 & n.l (1980); United States v.
Saperstein, 723 F.2d 1221, 1224 (6th Cir. 1983).
134. See Beyond the Border, supra note 100, at 763-77. In United States v. Des
Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 503-04 (9th Cir. 1984), modified on other grounds, 772 F.2d 578
(9th Cir. 1985), a panel of the Ninth Circuit sharply criticized the reverse border search
exception, but still upheld its application due to the precedents established in Stanley and
United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961
(1983). The Des Jardins panel noted that suspicionless searches of exiting individuals
lacked historical justification because neither the first customs statute nor its legislative
history discussed exit searches. See Des Jardins, 747 F.2d at 503. The court found that
exits from the United States did not affect the government's interest in preventing narcot-
ics smuggling. See id at 503-04. In addition, exit searches were considered stigmatizing,
unlike entrance searches. See id Application of the reverse border search exception has
not been limited to the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Udofot, 711 F.2d 831, 839-40
(8th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 896 (1983); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 834
(2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981); United States v. Swarovski, 592 F.2d
131, 133 (2d Cir. 1979).
135. See supra note 134.
136. See United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 504-05 (9th Cir. 1984), modified
on other grounds, 772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Udofot, 711 F.2d 831,
839-40 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 896 (1983); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d
830, 834 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981); United States v. Stanley,
545 F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978).
137. See supra note 107.
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the border search and reverse border search exceptions, Congress incor-
porated a warrant requirement into the Currency and Foreign Transac-
tions Reporting Act. 138 A warrant to search an individual entering or
leaving the country suspected of violating section 5316 could only be ob-
tained on a showing of probable cause. 139 However, the statute purport-
edly did not affect the government's authority to conduct searches under
existing law.'" This raised the question of whether the border search
and reverse border search exceptions constituted other authority to con-
duct searches of travelers.
In United States v. Chemaly, the Eleventh Circuit held that the border
search exceptions would not relieve the government of the obligation to
obtain a search warrant based on probable cause.141 Chemaly, the only
case to address this issue,' 42 was based on a reading of both the legislative
history143 and the statute,'" and provided a reasonable restraint on law
enforcement officials.
Less than one month after the Chemaly decision, Congress amended
the statute and effectively emasculated the warrant requirement. 45 Cus-
toms officials now have the broad authority to stop and search travelers
without a warrant if there is only "reasonable cause" to believe that sec-
tion 5316 is being violated."' Although this standard provides some-
what greater protection for travelers than the border search and reverse
border search exceptions, 47 it makes invalid assumptions about those
exceptions 4 8 and cannot be justified under Terry.14 9
138. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(a) (1982).
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See United States v. Chemaly, 741 F.2d 1346, 1352 (1 1th Cir.), reh'g granted, 741
F.2d 1363 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), order granting reh'g vacated and panel opinion
reinstated, 764 F.2d 747 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
142. See Chemaly, 741 F.2d at 1351.
143. See id. at 1350. The Senate Report stated that the warrant's purpose "is to avoid
an excessive burden on persons entering or leaving the country." S. Rep. No. 1139, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970). The supplemental statements of Senators Bennett, Tower,
Goodell and Packwood underscore this view. See id. at 19.
144. See Chemaly, 741 F.2d at 1351 ("To construe the statute as suggested by the
government would render it meaningless.").
145. Chemaly was decided on September 20, 1984, see Chemaly, 741 F.2d at 1346, and
§ 5317(b) was adopted on October 12, 1984, see Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 901(a), 98 Stat.
2135 (1984) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.A. § 5317(b) (West Supp. 1985).
146. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5317(b) (West Supp. 1985).
147. It should be remembered that routine border searches, and routine reverse border
searches in those courts that recognize that exception, do not require any suspicion. See
supra notes 107-08, 136-37 and accompanying text. Section 5317(b) requires "reasonable
cause" before the government may conduct a search. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5317(b) (West
Supp. 1985).
148. See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
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III. FOURTH AMENDMENT REPERCUSSIONS
A. The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act
1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5316 and 5317
Because of the fourth amendment jurisprudence described above,
courts can markedly favor the government in section 5316 prosecu-
tions.150 To illustrate the statute's use, consider a typical money-laun-
dering investigation. A passenger checks his luggage and gets a boarding
pass. As he is about to leave the country, a customs service agent ap-
proaches him. The agent asks the passenger if he is carrying $10,000 or
more of currency and whether the individual has filed a report pursuant
to 31 U.S.C. § 5316.
Under the stop and frisk exception enunciated in Terry v. Ohio,15' the
agent can approach a passenger politely and question him.' This con-
sensual police-public interaction is classified as an encounter.'5 3 An "en-
counter," it must be remembered, falls outside the fourth amendment
and does not require that the agent satisfy any standard of proof. The
"encounter" may rise to a "stop" if the passenger stirs reasonable suspi-
cion in the mind of the agent that criminal activity is afoot and that the
traveler is armed. 155 For example, reasonable suspicion could arise if the
person approached becomes nervous or gives an evasive answer to the
agent's questions. Once reasonable suspicion is present, the agent can
momentarily detain the passenger and conduct a limited search for weap-
ons if the agent reasonably believes he or others are in danger.'56 Should
reasonable suspicion escalate to probable cause, the agent can arrest the
passenger and conduct a search incident to a lawful arrest. 57 If reason-
able suspicion does not rise to the level of probable cause, the agent must
release the person because there would be no basis for a prolonged
detention.
In the scenario outlined, no reason exists for the agent to believe that
his safety is threatened. The passenger would probably be in the depar-
ture lounge. Ordinarily, he would have had to pass through an airport
magnetometer and security check and is unlikely to be armed. Arguably,
the passenger should not be searched. However, assuming that despite
airport security the agent reasonably believes his safety is endangered,
150. The statute has already survived one fourth amendment challenge in California
Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 63 (1974). The Court upheld § 5316 on the basis of
Congress' plenary authority to regulate foreign commerce, and, apparently, on the basis
of the reverse border exception. See id at 59, 63.
151. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See supra notes 64-72.
152. See id at 19 n.16.
153. See Florida v. Rodriguez, 105 S. Ct. 308, 310 (1984); United States v. Menden-
hall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
154. See supra note 153.
155. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
156. See id
157. See id at 25.
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then Terry would permit the agent to pat down the suspect for weap-
ons.15 Although one might argue that the Royer plurality, ' 9 and the
three concurring justices in Mendenhall,6 ° would allow the agent to
search the suspect for money, a proper reading of Terry forecloses this
option. Terry rests on the notion that an officer should be allowed to
protect himself during an investigative stop.16 ' Clearly, a search for
money would be merely a search for evidence and thus beyond the policy
of officer safety.
The scenario just described may also be analyzed under the reverse
border search exception to the fourth amendment. 62 Under that excep-
tion, law enforcement officers have wide discretion to search a departing
passenger. 63 Therefore, a customs service agent could routinely search
the luggage of anyone leaving the country. Under the reverse border
search exception, no standard of proof is required for an ordinary
search"6 and only minimal suspicion is necessary to permit a patdown
search. 165 Only reasonable suspicion is required for a full strip search. 1
66
Hence, the standard of proof necessary to permit the minimal intrusion
of a stop and frisk on the street would enable a law enforcement officer to
strip search an individual about to leave the country. 67
Section 5317, however, provides the Currency and Foreign Transac-
tions Reporting Act with its own search and seizure provisions. Prior to
the addition of section 5317(b), the fourth amendment rights of travelers
were adequately protected by the warrant and probable cause require-
ments of section 5317(a). Section 5317(b) signals a willingness on the
part of Congress to retreat from meaningful fourth amendment
protections.
The Senate Report justifies section 5317(b) by observing that
[t]his on the spot authority of the Customs Service would significantly
enhance the effectiveness in monitoring and apprehending persons rea-
sonably believed to be violating the currency reporting provisions of
the law. The Committee is fully convinced that such authority is not
only needed, but constitutional, under the line of cases holding that
warrantless "border searches" are reasonable even without probable
cause under the Fourth Amendment.168
158. See id. at 27.
159. See 460 U.S. 491, 498-99, 500 (1983). See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying
text.
160. See 446 U.S. 544, 565 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). See supra notes 73-83 and
accompanying text.
161. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
162. See supra notes 99-137 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 99-113 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 107.
165. See supra note 110.
166. See supra notes 111, 114 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 64-72, 99-137 and accompanying text.
168. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 303, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 3182, 3482.
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The statute expressly includes reverse border searches. 69 Yet the Sen-
ate Report did not ae d.iress a critical difference between the border search
and reverse border search exceptions. Congress relied on the questiona-
ble dictum in California Bankers 170 and ignored the fact that the border
search exception is based on the sovereign's right to control who or what
may enter the country-not who or what may leave the country.'17
Thus, although section 5317(b) provides greater fourth amendment pro-
tections to those entering the country, 7 2 it validates a judicial creation-
the reverse border search exception-marked by questionable
underpinnings.
Of even greater concern is that section 5317(b) ignores the clear policy
behind the Supreme Court's holding in Terry v. Ohio. 7 3 Terry permits
an officer to stop and frisk individuals based on less than probable cause
in order to ensure the officer's safety while he conducts an investiga-
tion.174 In addition, Terry has never been expanded to include a search
for evidence. Yet this is precisely what Congress has done by allowing
customs officers to stop and search individuals for money as they leave
the country.175 Thus, while section 5317(b) is a significant addition to
the drug enforcement arsenal, it brushes aside fourth amendment
protections.
2. 31 U.S.C. § 5313
In California Bankers the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
31 U.S.C. § 5313.176 One argument advanced was that the domestic re-
porting requirements violate the fourth amendment rights of both the
banks and the depositors.' 7 7 The Court addressed the issue by analyzing
169. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5317(b) (West Supp. 1985).
170. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 63 (1974); see S. Rep. No. 225,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 303, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3182, 3482.
171. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 147.
173. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
174. See icL at 30-31.
175. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5317(b) (West Supp. 1985).
176. 416 U.S. 21, 41-43 (1974). The plaintiffs, the California Bankers Association, the
Security National Bank and the American Civil Liberties Union, raised several constitu-
tional objections, all of which the Court rejected. The statute's recordkeeping require-
ments did not violate the bank plaintiffs' rights to due process. See id. at 45-49. Nor did
the recordkeeping provisions violate the fourth amendment rights of any plaintiff. Id. at
52. The Court further found no violation of the right against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion in the recordkeeping provisions. See id. at 55.
177. The Court noted that the domestic reporting provisions only applied to banks and
financial institutions to the extent the provisions were implemented by the regulations.
See id at 58. The depositor plaintiffs nonetheless alleged that their fourth amendment
rights were implicated. See iL at 67. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
The plaintiffs also argued that the foreign reporting requirements violated their fourth
amendment rights. See id. at 59. Observing that "reporting requirements are by no
means per se violations of the Fourth Amendment," id. at 59-60, the Court analogized
the requirements at issue with the tax collection process, see id. at 60. The Court upheld
the regulations as being "sufficiently tailored" to require reporting of only those transac-
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the broad language of section 5313 as limited by the strict requirements
of the statute's regulation.' 7 Although the Court held that the reporting
of domestic transactions by financial institutions did not violate a bank's
fourth amendment rights,'7 9 the rights of the depositors were not dis-
cussed. This issue was dismissed for lack of standing because no individ-
ual depositor could show that he or she had actually transacted more
than $ 10,000-the threshold amount for the reporting requirements pur-
suant to the regulations.180
Subsequently, in United States v. Miller,'81 the Court, addressing the
question expressly reserved in California Bankers, held that there was no
expectation of privacy in deposited checks. 82 The Court remarked that
checks are negotiable instruments used in commercial transactions and
not confidential communications.1 83 The Court concluded that the de-
positors lacked a fourth amendment interest.1 84 In addition, the Court
enunciated an "assumption of risk" theory8 5 which was later employed
in Smith v. Maryland."8 6 Thus, a depositor who transacts more than
$10,000 with a financial institution cannot challenge 31 U.S.C. § 5313
under the fourth amendment because he lacks a legitimate expectation of
privacy in a check.187
In Smith v. Maryland,8 ' the Court addressed the question of "whether
tions that "have the greatest potential for.., circumvention [of the laws of the United
States]." See id. at 63. In addition, the Court took note of the fact that the requirements
dealt with foreign commerce-an area where Congress has "plenary authority." See id.
at 59-60. It should be noted that it was in this portion of the California Bankers opinion
that provided the dictum that has given rise to the reverse border search exception. See
id. at 63 (dictum). See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
178. Id. at 63-65; see also id. at 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring) ("A significant extension
of the regulations' reporting requirements... would pose substantial and difficult consti-
tutional questions for me .... At some point, governmental intrusion upon these areas
would implicate legitimate expectations of privacy.").
179. Id. at 66-67. Justice Rehnquist indicated that this question was an easy one for a
majority of the Court. See id. at 66. Finding the regulations reasonable, the Court
stated:
[T]o the extent that the regulations in connection [with abnormally large trans-
actions in currency].., require the bank to obtain information from a customer
simply because the Government wants it, the information is sufficiently de-
scribed and limited in nature, and sufficiently related to a tenable congressional
determination as to improper use of transactions of that type in interstate com-
merce, so as to withstand the Fourth Amendment challenge made by the bank
plaintiffs.
Id. at 67.
180. Id. at 68.
181. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
182. See id. at 442.
183. See id. at 441-42.
184. See id. at 440.
185. "The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the informa-
tion will be conveyed by that person to the Government." Id. at 443 (citing United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971)).
186. 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). See infra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
187. See United States v. Kaatz, 705 F.2d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 1983).
188. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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the installation and use of a pen register constitutes a 'search'" for fourth
amendment purposes.'8 9 The Court held that there was no legitimate
expectation of privacy in phone numbers. 9 ' The Court placed the tele-
phone user in the same category as the bank depositor in Miller and re-
lied on an "assumption of risk" theory.' 9 ' In essence, the theory
provides that where an individual uses a bank or a telephone, he volunta-
rily turns over information to third parties and therefore assumes the risk
that such information will be turned over to the govermment.' 92 Smith,
therefore, gives the government tremendous access to personal and finan-
cial data.1 93
This decision and its assumption of risk theory have been criticized.
Professor Yale Kamisar has observed:
[I]t is beginning to look as if the only way someone living in our soci-
ety can avoid 'assuming the risk' that various intermediary institutions
will reveal information to the police is by engaging in drastic disci-
pline, the kind of discipline characteristic of life under totalitarian re-
gimes.... We do not have a free society if a citizen is put to the
choice, to cite but three examples, of, one, foregoing use of the phone
or having the police record all the numbers he dials, or, two, foregoing
use of the postal service or having the police collect the names and
addresses of all his correspondents, or, three, foregoing use of banks or
providing the police with access to an enormous quantity of highly
personal data. . . The sky is the limit, aside from whatever 'self-
discipline' the police or other agency may choose to exercise.' 94
Justice Marshall's dissent in Smith is no less powerful than the critique
by Professor Kamisar. Justice Marshall attacked the assumption of risk
theory for compelling those who disclose certain facts to banks or tele-
phone companies for limited purposes to assume that the information
will be released to others for virtually any other purpose. 95 He con-
cluded: "[W]hether privacy expectations are legitimate within the mean-
ing of Katz depends not on the risks an individual can be presumed to
189. Id. at 736 (footnote omitted). A pen register is a device that mechanically records
numbers dialed on a telephone. Id. at 736 n.1.
190. See id. at 742. The Court followed the approach of Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967), to determine whether an individual may invoke the protection of
the fourth amendment. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 739-41.
191. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
192. Id.
193. Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment, in J. Choper, Y. Kamisar & L Tribe, The
Supreme Court: Trends and Developments 1978-1979: An Edited Transcript of the First
Annual Supreme Court Review and Constitutional Law Symposium 143-45 (1979).
194. Id.
195. Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Note, Reasonable Expec-
tations of Privacy in Bank Records. A Reappraisal of United States v. Miller and Bank
Depositor Privacy Rights, 72 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 243, 256 (1981) ("Depositors
should not be forced to assume the risk of record disclosure because the danger in using
risk analysis is its unlimited scope. Only a narrow assumption of the risk exception to
fourth amendment coverage will adequately protect defendants in phone booths, office
areas, and common areas of dwellings.").
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accept when imparting information to third parties, but on the risks he
should be forced to assume in a free and open society."' 19 6
To protect an individual's privacy in his domestic banking transactions
and to redress the balance between government interests and individual
rights, courts should give standing to individuals to challenge the consti-
tutionality of 31 U.S.C. § 5313 under the fourth amendment. However,
to accomplish such a result, the assumption of risk theory must be re-
jected and Miller must be overruled.
In his Smith dissent, Justice Marshall presents a common sense and
compelling rationale for rejecting the assumption of the risk theory. The
theory implies that freedom of choice is present. 197 In modern society,
however, the use of telephones and negotiable instruments are a virtual
necessity. 198 In addition, the assumption of the risk approach theoreti-
cally enables the government to determine the fourth amendment's
scope.1 99 As Justice Marshall observed, the government could announce
that it would randomly open mail or listen to telephone conversations. 2°°
The public would then be on notice of the risk one would take in using
the mail or the telephone2"' and significant fourth amendment protec-
tions would be emasculated.
B. 18 U.S.C. § 1001
Section 1001, the fraudulent statements statute, does not directly raise
fourth amendment issues. Indirectly, however, it plays a role in creating
reasonable suspicion or probable cause in the minds of law enforcement
officers. If a customs service agent has a reliable tip that a passenger is
carrying more than $10,000, he would likely approach that passenger
and ask whether he is transporting such amounts. Should the passenger
answer "no," the law enforcement officer still may find that he has rea-
sonable suspicion to believe that the individual has, or is about to engage
in criminal activity. Even if the officer merely had reasonable suspicion
regarding the particular passenger before the questions were asked, a
negative answer by the passenger still might create probable cause. Here,
reasonable suspicion becomes probable cause despite the individual's be-
havior. In essence, reasonable suspicion is the basis of probable cause,
196. Smith, 442 U.S. at 750.
197. See id. at 749.
198. See id. at 750.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Id. The Smith majority acknowledged these dangers and indicated that "where
an individual's subjective expectation had been 'conditioned' by influences alien to well-
recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could
play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection
was." Id. at 741 n.5. Although the Court stated that in such circumstances, a "norma-
tive inquiry" could be made into the existence of a "legitimate expectation of privacy," it
is unclear how extreme the government's conduct would have to be to trigger this exami-
nation. See id. at 740-41 n.5. This point was noted by Justice Marshall. Id. at 750
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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eliminating the distinctions necessary to protect fourth amendment
rights of the public and potential defendants.
IV. FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS
The fifth amendment provides that "no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." '2 0 2 It protects both the
innocent and the guilty2"3 and is designed to preserve our adversarial
system of justice.2"
The general rule is that the fifth amendment privilege is not self-exe-
cuting.20 5 Thus, the privilege must be asserted when self-incrimination is
threatened.20 6 If a person freely chooses to answer, the statement is not
compelled and is deemed voluntary.207 There are three exceptions to the
general rule of a timely assertion of the fifth amendment privilege: when
an individual is subject to custodial interrogation;208 when a person is
threatened with a penalty if he asserts the privilege;2 9 and in the context
of certain self-reporting statutes, where claiming the privilege is self-in-
criminating in and of itself.210 Based on two Supreme Court decisions, 211
an individual's silence in the face of a self-reporting statute is a valid fifth
amendment claim if: the statute requires disclosure of information that
may create a real and substantial risk of self-incrimination;2 2 the statute
is aimed at an area permeated with criminal activity and at a highly sus-
pect group;213 and the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute was
prosecutorial, not regulatory.21 4
202. U.S. Coast. amend. V.
203. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 51 (1968).
204. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976).
205. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429 (1984).
206. See id
207. See United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943).
208. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429 (1984). Two reasons have been ad-
vanced by the Court to justify this exception. Officers conducting custodial interrogation
usually are "acutely aware of the potentially incriminatory nature of the disclosure
sought." See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657 (1976). In addition, a custodial
situation involves "inherently compelling pressures" that whittle away at one's resistence
and induce one to speak when he otherwise would not do so. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
209. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984); see, eg., Lefkowitz v. Turley.
414 U.S. 70, 82-83 (1973) (state demanded that individuals waive immunty and testify
under threat of being removed as public contractors); Uniformed Sanitation Men v. Com-
missioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 283-84 (1968) (employees told that failure to sign
waiver of immunity would lead to dismissal); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278-79
(1968) (police officer who refused to waive his right against self-incrimination discharged
for not testifying before a grand jury); Garrity v. Nev Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1967)
(privilege not waived when individual responds to questions after being threatened with
discharge from employment if he exercised the privilege).
210. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984).
211. See infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
212. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53-54 (1968).
213. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 64 (1968). See infra note 235.
214. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 58-59. This third prong of the Marchetti-Grosso test had
its genesis in the required records doctrine. In essence, that doctrine provided that the
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The self-reporting statute exception has its roots in Marchetti v. United
States2" 5 and Grosso v. United States.216 In those cases, petitioners were
gamblers who refused to comply with federal tax statutes that imposed
excise and occupational taxes on wagering activities and required the pe-
titioners to supply the Internal Revenue Service with detailed informa-
tion about their gambling activities. 2 7  Although petitioners did not
claim the fifth amendment privilege, they failed to comply with the stat-
utes.2"' The Court held that the petitioners could not be prosecuted for
failure to comply with the statute.21 9 The Court found that the statute
was aimed at an area permeated by crime and at an inherently suspect
group.220 Moreover, the information sought by the IRS was used to fight
illegal gambling.22 1 Either reporting or claiming the privilege would
identify the petitioners as gamblers, thus creating a significant risk of
self-incrimination.222 As a result, petitioners were foreclosed from any
possibility of free choice between answering or claiming the privilege.
Although there was precedent that the petitioners had a choice-the
choice not to gamble223 -the Court rejected that argument and stated:
"The question is not whether the petitioner holds a 'right' to violate state
law, but whether, having done so, he may be compelled to give evidence
fifth amendment privilege cannot be asserted vis-a-vis "records required by law to be kept
in order that there may be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate
subjects of governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions validly estab-
lished." Id. at 55-56 (quoting Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (quoting
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911))); see also Grosso v. United States, 390
U.S. 62, 73 (1968) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("we know that where the governmental
scheme clearly evidences the purpose of gathering information from citizens in order to
secure their conviction of crime, it contravenes the privilege"). See infra note 235.
215. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
216. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
217. Grosso, 390 U.S. at 63; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 40-41.
218. In Marchetti, the petitioner failed to pay an occupational tax and failed to register
before entering the business of bookmaking. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 41. In Grosso, the
petitioner failed to pay a wagering excise tax and occupational tax. Grosso, 390 U.S. at
63.
219. See Grosso, 390 U.S. at 70; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 61.
220. See Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 47.
221. Grosso, 390 U.S. at 66; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 47. The Court noted that the IRS
had indicated it makes the names and addresses of those who have paid the wagering
taxes available to law enforcement authorities. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48. It is possi-
ble that the prosecutions would have been constitutional had "Congress imposed explicit
restrictions upon the use of information obtained as a consequence of paying the tax."
Grosso, 390 U.S. at 66.
222. See Grosso, 390 U.S. at 66-67; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48-49, 53. The standard
used for determining whether the privilege will apply is whether the claimant faces a real
and substantial chance of incrimination. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 53. The Court was
unambiguous in its view of the gambling statute's impact on the petitioners. Incrimina-
tion was an "unmistakable consequence," see Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 49, and an "unavoid-
abl[e]" result, see Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67, of complying with the statute.
223. In Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955), the Court held that the fifth
amendment was not violated by registration and occupational tax requirements because a
gambler may freely choose between gambling and his constitutional rights. See id. at
422-23. The Marchetti Court rejected that rationale. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 51.
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against himself. The constitutional privilege was intended to shield the
guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent and foresighted." 4
In Haynes v. United States,22 the Court reversed the petitioner's con-
viction for violating a federal statute that required the registration of un-
lawful firearms.226 Adhering to the analysis in Marchetti and Grosso,"7
the Court held that the petitioner could not be prosecuted for failure to
comply with the statute.2 28 Because the statute was directed at an inher-
ently suspect group 229 and did not address an area that was essentially
regulatory and non-criminal,230 then either reporting, or claiming, the
privilege would create a substantial risk of prosecution.23 1 Consequently,
the petitioner did not possess a free choice between answering and claim-
ing the privilege.
The Supreme Court and circuit courts, however, have apparently been
unwilling to expand or even maintain the scope of the self-reporting stat-
ute exception. For example, in California v. Byers,232 a divided Supreme
Court2 33 upheld a California statute that required drivers involved in ac-
cidents to report their names and addresses to the police.23 The plural-
ity held that the statute was directed at the general public and that the
purpose of the statute was essentially regulatory.235 In Garner v. United
224. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 51.
225. 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
226. See id. at 100-01.
227. See supra notes 215-24 and accompanying text.
228. See Haynes, 390 U.S. at 100-01.
229. Id at 96.
230. Id at 98-99. Interestingly, the Court did not employ the legislative intent factor
used in Marchetti and Grosso. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
231. Id at 97.
232. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
233. Justice Burger's plurality opinion was joined by Justices Stewart, White and
Blackmun. See id. at 425. Justice Harlan issued an opinion concurring in the judgment.
See id at 434. Justice Black's dissent was joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan. Id. at
459. Justice Brennan wrote his own dissent as well, in which Justices Douglas and Mar-
shall joined. Id at 464.
234. Id at 426 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.). This case was particularly impor-
tant because statutes similar to the one at issue were in effect in the other 49 states and in
the District of Columbia. See id at 425 (plurality opinion of Burger, CJ.).
235. See id at 430-31 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.). Chief Justice Burger noted
that being involved in a traffic accident did not usually lead to criminal liability. See id.
at 431 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.). In Byers, Justice Harlan read Marchetti and
Grosso very narrowly, stating that those cases provided a one prong test for the self-
reporting statute exception. See id. at 437 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). Harlan's
view was that under Marchetti and Grosso, the privilege's applicability turned exclusively
on the individual's belief that a real risk of self-incrimination existed. See id. (Harlan, J.,
concurring in judgment) He asserted, however, that the presence of this risk is not a
"sufficient predicate" for extending the privilege to regulatory enactments. See id. at 439
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
Thus, under Harlan's approach, the self-reporting statute exception is not limited to
statutes that are prosecutorial. When a regulatory scheme is involved, Harlan would
balance "the assertedly non-criminal governmental purpose in securing the information,
the necessity for self-reporting as a means of securing the information, and the nature of
the disclosures required." See id at 454. When these factors were considered in Byers,
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States,2 3 6 the Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction for conspiring to
"fix" sporting contests and to assist in the placing of bets and the distri-
bution of the illegal proceeds.237 The government had introduced into
evidence the petitioner's federal tax return where he described himself as
a professional gambler. 238 In distinguishing this case from Marchetti,239
the Court found that unlike the tax forms in Marchetti, federal income
tax returns are not directed at an inherently suspect group.240 In addi-
tion, the Court observed that Garner had the free choice to refuse to
answer the relevant question on the tax form.24 Thus, Garner's tax re-
turn could have been offered as evidence at trial without violating the
petitioner's fifth amendment privilege.242
In Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research
Group,2 4 3 the Court upheld section 1113 of the Department of Defense
Authorization Act of 1983,24 which denies federal financial aid, under
Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, to male students between
18 and 26 who fail to register for the draft. 4 However, the regulations
issued pursuant to section 1113 allowed late registrants to receive Title
IV benefits.246 Those required to register were obligated to do so within
thirty days of their eighteenth birthday.247 A wilful failure to register
within that period is a criminal offense under 50 U.S.C. § 462(a).241 The
petitioners argued that section 1113 "violates the Fifth Amendment by
compelling nonregistrants to acknowledge that they have failed to regis-
ter timely when confronted with certifying to their schools that they have
complied with the registration law." '249 The Court, however, held that
there was no compulsion because petitioners had a choice-the choice
not to seek financial aid.25 ° This is similar to the rationale that Marchetti
explicitly had rejected.25' However, the Court was able to avoid engag-
use of the privilege was not permitted. See id. at 458. Justice Black rejected any balanc-
ing test because it would "inevitably [lead to] ... the dilution of constitutional guaran-
tees." Id. at 463 (Black, J., dissenting).
Byers is also significant because three Justices indicated that the self-reporting statute
exception could be applied even when the challenged statute was not directed at an inher-
ently suspect group. See id. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
236. 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
237. See id. at 649-50.
238. Id.
239. 390 U.S. 39 (1968). See supra notes 215-24 and accompanying text.
240. See Garner, 424 U.S. at 660-61.
241. See id. at 657.
242. Id. at 665.
243. 104 S. Ct. 3348 (1984).
244. Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1113,
96 Stat. 748.
245. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 104 S. Ct. at 3359.
246. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.27(b)(1) (1983) (repealed at 50 Fed. Reg. 26,953 (1985)).
247. See 3 C.F.R. § 82 (1981) (Presidential Proclamation No. 4771).
248. See 50 U.S.C. § 462(a) (1982).
249. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 104 S. Ct. at 3358.
250. See id. at 3358-59.
251. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 51 (1968).
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ing in a meaningful Marchetti-Grosso analysis because the petitioners
never attempted to register for the draft.252
Other self-reporting statutes have been upheld despite fifth amendment
challenges.253 In Alcaraz v. Block,254 the challenged statute required the
petitioner to give his social security number when he applied to get his
children enrolled in the school food program.255 Petitioner, an illegal
alien, challenged the statute as a violation of his fifth amendment rights
because failure to include his social security number on the application
could alert the authorities to his status as an illegal alien.256 The court
held that there was no fifth amendment violation because the plaintiff
was not legally compelled to provide the Department of Agriculture with
any information concerning whether he had a social security number.257
Although the court was unclear on this point, it appeared to determine
that there was no legal compulsion because the plaintiff was free not to
apply for benefits under the school food program."28 In United States v.
Flores,259 the Ninth Circuit considered the fifth amendment issues of 18
U.S.C. § 922(e), a statute requiring individuals shipping firearms to give
prior notice to the common carrier.261 The court held that there was
neither self-incrimination nor compulsion because the defendant was not
forced to transport firearms.261 The court was able to distinguish
252. In a footnote, the Court distinguished Marchetti and Grosso as cases where the
"very filing necessarily admitted illegal ... activity." See Minnesota Pub. Interest Re-
search Group, 104 S. Ct. at 3359 n.16. In Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, the
Court was not confronted with a true Marchetti-Grosso problem. When students applied
for financial aid, they were required to certify that they had registered for the draft. See
id at 3351. However, they were under no obligation to disclose when they registered.
See id at 3358. Thus, by applying for financial aid, the student was not subjecting him-
self to possible criminal prosecution for registering late. See id. The student would,
however, be in a Marchetti-Grosso situation when he was actually registering late because
the draft registration card must be dated and contain the registrant's date of birth. See id.
Because the petitioners had never attempted to register, this more difficult question was
not at issue. See id. at 3359.
Justice Marshall viewed this issue as sufficiently ripe because of the economic coercion
effectively placed on the petitioners. See id at 3365, 3367 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Although not discussing the prosecutorial or regulatory nature of the challenged statute,
Justice Marshall did find that the other two prongs of the self-reporting statute exception
were met-that the statute is aimed at a "group inherently suspect of criminal activity,"
see id at 3367 (Marshall, J., dissenting), and that the law coerces the petitioners into a
substantial risk of prosecution, see id at 3368 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
253. The Bank Secrecy Act has similarly been upheld against a fifth amendment chal-
lenge. See infra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
254. 746 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1984).
255. See 42 U.S.C. § 1758(d)(1) (1982).
256. Alcaraz, 746 F.2d at 603.
257. Id at 603-04. The court found that Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Inter-
est Research Group, 104 S. Ct. 3348 (1984), disposed of the plaintiffs claim because
there, just as in Alcaraz, any compulsion present was merely economic. See Alcaraz, 746
F.2d at 603-04.
258. See id
259. 753 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985) (en bane).
260. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) (1982).
261. See Flores, 753 F.2d at 1503.
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Marchetti because the statute in Flores was not directed at an inherently
suspect group but at the general public.262 Moreover, the court found
that the non-prosecutorial purpose of the statute was substantial2 63 and
that there was no real hazard of self-incrimination in the notice
requirement.26
V. FIFTH AMENDMENT REPERCUSSIONS
Having reviewed the relevant fifth amendment issues, the question to
be resolved is whether using the Currency and Foreign Transactions Re-
porting Act, more specifically 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313 and 5316, and the
fraudulent statements statute contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1001, seriously
threatens the fifth amendment rights of the banking and traveling public.
A. The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act
1. 31 U.S.C. § 5316
Section 5316, which requires persons transporting $10,000 or more out
of the United States to file a report,265 unquestionably provides customs
service agents and other law enforcement personnel with considerable
leeway to investigate money-laundering. Failure to report can lead to
prosecution.2 66  Thus far, the statute has withstood challenges based on
the self-reporting statute exception. The Second Circuit confronted this
question in United States v. Dichne.267 The statute was upheld because it
was not directed at an inherently suspect group, and because there was
no "direct linkage between the required disclosure and the potential
criminal activity. '261 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit rejected a defendant's
argument that the statute violated her right against self-incrimination. 269
Employing a variation on the three part test described in this Article,2 71
262. See id. at 1501-02.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 1503.
265. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5316 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985).
266. 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1982) provides that willful failure to report under § 5316 can
lead to criminal prosecution.
267. 612 F.2d 632, 638-41 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980).
268. Id. at 641. The court correctly observed that the statute is directed at all individ-
uals crossing the border with more than $5000 in monetary instruments. See id. at 639.
However, this ignores the possibility that federal agents could direct enforcement at a
group highly suspect in appearance. Although this might prevent some money-launder-
ing, other money-launderers could still circumvent the statute. Moreover, such selective
enforcement could make the statute vulnerable to a fifth amendment challenge if a court
gave the highly suspect group requirement an overly expansive reading.
269. See United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 507-09 (9th Cir. 1984), modified
on other grounds, 772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985).
270. See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text. The court employed a balancing
approach that weighed the public interest in disclosure against the individual's claim for
constitutional protection. See United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 508 (9th Cir.
1984) (citing California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1971)), modified on other grounds,
772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985). The first step in the analysis was an evaluation of the
"individual claim to constitutional protections." See Des Jardins, 747 F.2d at 508. This
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the court found that the statute did not create a real danger of self-in-
crimination.27' However, if the statute were to become widely used in
the fight against the laundering of "narco-dollars," then the nature of the
information sought would no longer be deemed unrelated to criminal
prosecutions. The regulatory nature of the statute might then be called
into question. The statute could be increasingly aimed at a highly suspi-
cious group-money-launderers. In addition, although affirmatively an-
swering that one is transporting more than $10,000 would not
automatially lead to prosecution, it could place a traveler at a much
greater risk of investigation, and possibly prosecution. Such an interpre-
tation might make section 5316 vulnerable to a Marchetti-Grosso analy-
sis. Thus, silence or not reporting could become a valid claim of the fifth
amendment privilege. Such an alternative would eviscerate the substan-
tial benefits section 5316 provides in combating the country's drug
problem.
2. 31 U.S.C. § 5313
In California Bankers the Supreme Court held that the record keeping
provision of the Bank Secrecy Act did not violate the fifth amendment
rights of banks because incorporated banks, like other corporations, have
no privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 27 '2 The Court found
the depositor plaintiff's argument that the reporting requirements violate
the fifth amendment to be premature.273 Subsequently, the Tenth Cir-
cuit upheld the statute's validity against a fifth amendment challenge be-
cause the depositor was under no compulsion to enter into financial
transactions with the bank.2 74 In that case, the currency transaction re-
port was completed by the bank.27  The regulations, however, provide
that individuals involved in a transaction may be required to file a report
if the individual falls within the definition of "financial institution. '27 6 In
involved deciding whether compliance with the statute created a significant risk of in-
crimination. See id. To determine whether such a risk was present, the Ninth Circuit
looked to three factors: first, whether criminal statutes or regulatory statutes permeated
the area; second, whether the statute is aimed at an inherently suspect group; and third,
whether compliance with the statute would be a significant piece of evidence against the
individual. See id.
Although the statute's constitutionality withstood analysis under each prong, two of
the court's observations highlight potential vulnerabilities. The court remarked that the
statute is not directed at an exclusively regulatory area. See id. In addition, Congress
intended that the statute's requirements provide information that would be helpful in
criminal investigations. See id at 509 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 20,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4394, 4405).
271. See Des Jardins, 747 F.2d at 509.
272. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974).
273. See id at 72. The Court did not reach this question because the depositor plain-
tiffs had not yet made a claim of privilege regarding information sought by the Secretary
of the Treasury under the statute. See id at 73.
274. See United States v. Kaatz, 705 F.2d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 1983).
275. See id. at 1241.
276. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(b) (1985). See supra note 4.
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that circumstance, section 5313 becomes more susceptible to the
Marchetti-Grosso attack outlined above.277
B. 18 U.S.C. § 1001
Section 1001 does not raise a per se fifth amendment issue because a
false statement is not protected by the fifth amendment.278 Even when
an individual believes that a truthful answer may be self-incriminating,
the fifth amendment does not create a right to lie. 279 A person may hon-
estly decline to answer, but cannot knowingly and wilfully answer with a
falsehood.28 ° Thus, a false answer to a federal official will seemingly
violate section 1001 without fifth amendment consequences. Neverthe-
less, broad application of the statute has been considered "uncomfortably
close" to self-incrimination.281  Thus, the scope of the section has been
narrowed by some courts through the use of the "exculpatory no" doc-
trine in the context of questions by federal investigators.282 According to
this doctrine, a violation of section 1001 requires a statement, and for the
purpose of the statute, a statement requires more than a denial of guilt. 283
It mandates that the person make an affirmative statement calculated to
prevent the legitimate functions of the government.2 84
CONCLUSION
The thesis of this Article is straightforward: the fight against narcotics
must be balanced with the constitutional rights of the traveling public. If
narco-dollars cannot be laundered, the amount of narcotics imported and
distributed will be substantially lessened. Because the influx of drugs has
not been stopped by traditional investigatory means, recourse to sections
5313 and 5316 and 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is warranted. Concomitantly,
fourth and fifth amendment protections cannot be sacrificed. However,
277. See supra notes 215-71 and accompanying text.
278. See United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 178 (1977).
279. See id. at 180.
280. See id.; United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 577 (1976); Bryson v. United
States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969).
281. See United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane).
282. See United States v. Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894, 899-900 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 927 (1983); United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1213 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1972); Paternostro v. United
States, 311 F.2d 298, 309 (5th Cir. 1962). See generally Note, Judicial Reluctance to
Enforce the Federal False Statement Statute in Investigatory Situations, 51 Fordham L.
Rev. 515, 515-18 (1982) (discussing court rationales for giving a narrow reading to the
statute) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Reluctance].
283. United States v. Palzer, 745 F.2d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d
1208, 1212 (5th Cir. 1978); Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 305 (5th Cir.
1962). But see United States v. Grotke, 702 F.2d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v.
Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
284. See United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1212 (5th Cir. 1978).
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effective use of these statutes need not diminish the constitutional rights
guaranteed by the fourth and fifth amendments.
As to the public's fourth amendment rights, the consequences of the
broad power section 5317(b) provides government agents to search and
question departing passengers are alarming. An individual leaving the
United States essentially abdicates all fourth amendment rights.28 5 The
threat of official oppression cannot be overlooked. While any individual,
businessperson or drug dealer leaving the United States can be searched,
law enforcement officers will search only passengers they believe to be
suspicious. Since government law enforcement agents are in the business
of ferreting out crime, their judgment may be slightly prejudiced against
putative defendants. Can a society that prides itself on fairness and indi-
vidual freedoms grant law enforcement officers such wide discretion?
Should passengers be searched merely on the basis of their nationality or
ties with so-called drug trafficking countries like Pakistan or Colombia?
Rational safeguards are necessary to permit aggressive prosecution of
money-launderers under 31 U.S.C. § 5316 without jeopardizing fourth
amendment individual rights. Congress should repeal section 5317(b)
because of the significant fourth amendment concerns it presents to those
departing the country. Section 5317 is based in part on the criticized
reverse border search exception.28 6 The border search exception, in turn,
is based on the United States' right as a sovereign to protect itself.287 Its
rationale therefore should not extend to individuals leaving the United
States. The often ill-quoted dictum of California Bankers, that "those
entering and leaving the country may be examined as to their belongings
and effects, all without violating the Fourth Amendment,"2 should be
accurately referred to as the bare hypothesis it was and not be used as the
basis for a statutory exception to the fourth amendment's probable cause
and warrant requirements.28 9
In the absence of section 5317(b) and the ill-conceived reverse border
search exception, law enforcement officers would have to abide by the
dictates of Terry,29 ° when engaging in a warrantless stop. Thus, a de-
parting passenger could be stopped and searched only if the law enforce-
ment officer reasonably believes that his safety, or the safety of others,
were endangered.291 This search would be limited to a search for weap-
ons. Although one might argue that Mendenhall2 92 and Royer 293 leave
open the possibility that the agent could conduct a limited search for
285. See supra notes 99-137 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 116-37 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 120.
290. See supra note 64.
291. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). See supra notes 151-61 and accompany-
ing text.
292. See supra note 81.
293. See supra note 97.
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evidence, 294 a proper reading of Terry forecloses this possibility. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he purpose of [a Terry stop] is not
to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his inves-
tigation without fear of violence.
295
Fourth amendment concerns are also implicated by the use of section
5313 to combat money-laundering. The Supreme Court has held that
individuals lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in checks.296 This
rule, based on the problematic assumption of the risk theory,297 should
be abandoned because of its potential to obliterate fourth amendment
protections.298 Instead, the use of section 5313 should be subject to the
fourth amendment's reasonableness clause.
In addition to the fourth amendment problems previously outlined,
fifth amendment concerns are raised when the fraudulent statement stat-
ute is used in conjunction with sections 5313 and 5316. Although not
necessary, generally a customs service agent or other government agent
will approach a departing passenger on the basis of a "tip." The "tip"
may come from an informant, the Internal Revenue Service or both. A
person transporting $10,000 or more of currency out of the United States
then has three alternatives: to report the amount transported, to report
nothing or to make a valid claim of fifth amendment privilege. If an
ordinary person carrying more than $10,000 is about to leave the country
without having reported the amount pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5316, he
may become unnerved by the questioning of customs authorities. As-
suming that during the initial questioning the government agent has noti-
fied the traveler of the filing requirement, it is not unlikely that the
uninformed traveler, having failed to file the required report, might sim-
ply deny he is carrying $10,000 or more out of the country. The mere
''no" response is a willful lie to a federal agent and a direct violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1001.299 Unless the traveler is in an "exculpatory no" doc-
trine jurisdiction,3°° he has virtually no defense to a section 1001 prose-
cution. Moreover, because the traveler has failed to report the money he
is transporting, he has also violated 31 U.S.C. § 5316.301
To protect fifth amendment rights and to avoid making a mockery of
the privilege, government officials enforcing 31 U.S.C. § 5316 and 18
U.S.C. § 1001 should be required to inform all passengers of their right
to claim the privilege,3"2 thus enabling them to make a timely claim of
294. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
295. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1971). See supra note 69.
296. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976).
297. See id. at 443. See supra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 9.
300. See supra notes 282-84.
301. See supra note 8.
302. Cf. United States v. Mandujano, 425 US. 564, 598, 600 (1976) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (individual should be informed of his right against self-incrimination before testi-
fying in front of a grand jury).
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the privilege.3"3 Moreover, the dictates of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 should be
narrowed to prevent any uncomfortable closeness to self-incrimina-
tion.3" A general application of the "exculpatory no" doctrine would
adjust the balance between the government's interest in curtailing
money-laundering, while concomitantly affording individuals their con-
stitutional right against self-incrimination.30 5 This approach remains vi-
able after the decisions in United States v. Rodgers"6 and United States v.
Yermian3 °7 because in neither case did the Court address the "exculpa-
tory no" limitation on the statute.30 8
Prosecuting the sale and use of illegal narcotics properly remains a
paramount concern of law enforcement officials. Curbing money-laun-
dering may be the best and only way to decrease the illegal flow of drugs
into the United States. Individual rights, however, must not be sub-
sumed to the societal interest in fighting the country's drug problem.
Presently, the use of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Recording
Act together with the fraudulent statements statute raises significant
fourth and fifth amendment concerns. The proposals advanced in this
Article seek to reconcile the goal of eliminating the drug trade with the
constitutional rights that are the bedrock of our society.
303. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429 (1984).
304. See United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974).
305. See supra notes 278-84 and accompanying text. But see Judicial Reluctance,
supra note 282, at 532 ("exculpatory no" statements not protected by the fifth
amendment).
306. 466 U.S. 475 (1984).
307. 104 S. Ct. 2936 (1984).
308. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
1986]

